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INTRODUCTION 
 
The  influence  and  legality  of  unpaid  internships  are  the  subjects  of  much 
impassioned  commentary  but  little  careful  analysis.  Arguments  to  abolish  unpaid 
internships — that they are bar low- and moderate-income students from good careers 
and that they consist of demeaning chores — are intuitively appealing,  yet based on 
anecdotes instead of data.
1 The counterarguments — that elimination would leave fewer 
opportunities for students of all incomes and that unpaid internships teach critical skills 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Andrew Mark Bennett, Note, Unpaid Internships & The Department of Labor: The Impact of 
Underenforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act on Equal Opportunity, 11 UNIV. MD. L.J. RACE 
RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 293, 296-99 (2011); Steven Greenhouse, The Unpaid Intern, Legal or Not, 
N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 2, 2010, http://perma.cc/6D7K-GMDN. 2 
 
— are also unmoored from an empirical base.
2 The data pool on unpaid internships, small 
though it is, barely makes an appearance in the debate. 
Analysis of the key legal question, whether an intern at a for-profit company is an 
employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act ( “FLSA” or “the Act”) and so entitled to 
the minimum wage, suffers from a comparable lack of rigor. Media outlets, universities 
and self-proclaimed internship experts routinely mischaracterize the rules around unpaid 
internships, especially those at for-profit companies.
3 Law review articles focus on the 
FLSA, the Supreme Court’s 1947 decision Walling v. Portland Terminal Company,
4 and 
the Wage and Hour Division ’s  (“the  Division”)  Fact  Sheet  #71,  which  lays  out  the 
Division’s guidelines on when a for-profit employer can hire an intern without pay.
5 
Authors who touch on the essential line of lower court decisions most often stay at the 
surface, leaving unassessed the drivers of the judicial choices.
6 Yet any reform short of 
amending the FLSA will have to fit within judicial thinking on  unpaid work if it is to 
have a chance of success. 
This Note employs available data and parses existing law to construct a new test 
to replace Fact Sheet #71. The Note argues that promulgating an educational inquiry test 
that asks courts to weigh unpaid, for-profit internships’ educational value under a set of 
proven metrics is the best method to make internships worthwhile. In judging educational 
value directly rather than through the current proxy of college approval, courts will give 
fuller meaning to Portland Terminal and serve the core judicial concern: to maintain 
unpaid internships in which the intern learns and flourishes while eliminating those in 
which the intern is only free labor. 
Part I will explain the basic arguments against unpaid internships and present data 
to illuminate the merits of each. It will cite the little-known fact that most unpaid student 
interns are from moderate-income families, and discuss the significance of that fact for 
the pursuit  of equality.  Part  II  will outline the  doctrine on the  trainee  exception and 
suggest that despite conflicting language, the common judicial approach is to rely on 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Joseph E. Aoun, Protect Unpaid Internships, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 13, 2010), 
http://perma.cc/MD4Q-AKKY; Matthew Yglesias, Two Cheers for Unpaid Internships, SLATE (Dec. 4, 
2013, 12:22 PM), http://perma.cc/Y3GL-BZN9. 
3 Jessica Curiale, Note, America’s New Glass Ceiling: Unpaid Internships, the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
and the Urgent Need for Change, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 101, 115 (2010); see also Josh Sanburn, The Beginning 
of the End of the Unpaid Internship, TIME, May 2, 2012, http://perma.cc/3TNK-Y8CM (asserting that the 
Division’s six-factor test on the employee/intern distinction is part of the FLSA); Madeleine Overturf, 
Unpaid Internships Aren’t the Problem – Working For Credit Is, POLICYMIC (June 31, 2013), 
http://perma.cc/S98N-8KX9 (claiming that the FLSA does not protect interns that receive college credit).  
4 330 U.S. 148 (1947). 
5 See, e.g., Sarah Braun, Note, The Obama “Crackdown:” Another Failed Attempt to Regulate the 
Exploitation of Unpaid Internships, 41 SW. L. REV. 281, 288-300 (2011-2012); Craig Durrant, Note, To 
Benefit or Not to Benefit: Mutually Induced Consideration as a Test for the Legality of Unpaid Internships, 
162 U. PA. L. REV. 170, 172-79 (2013); Eric M. Fink, Note, No Money, Mo’ Problems: Why Unpaid Law 
Firm Internships are Illegal and Unethical, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 435, 445-49 (2013). 
6 See Aaron D. Kaufmann and Elizabeth C. Morris, Experience Pays, but Interns May Have to Be Paid for 
Their Experience: When Interns are Covered by Wage and Hour Laws, 27 CAL. LAB. & EMP. L. REV., no. 
6, 2013, at 3-4; Jessica A. Magaldi and Olha Kolisnyk, The Unpaid Internship: A Stepping Stone to a 
Successful Career or the Stumbling Block of an Illegal Enterprise? Finding the Right Balance Between 
Worker Autonomy and Worker Protection, 14 NEV. L.J. 184, 192-200 (2013); David C. Yamada, The 
Employment Law Rights of Student Interns, 35 CONN. L. REV. 215, 227-31 (2002); Bennett, supra note 1, at 
302-08; Curiale, supra note 3, at 111-14. 3 
 
school approval to decide if a person is an employee or a trainee. Part III will argue that 
financial incentives undercut colleges’ ability to police the educational value of unpaid 
internships, and thus the Division should adopt a new test focused on direct assessment of 
educational quality. The remainder of Part III will describe how the new test fits within 
the doctrine. The Note will conclude with a call for more light and less heat on the topic 
of unpaid internships. 
 
I.  BY THE NUMBERS: EQUALITY AND EDUCATION IN UNPAID INTERNSHIPS 
   
Modern internships have been around since the 1950s, but have only  risen to 
prominence  in  the  last  twenty  years.
7  60.5% of  the  approximately 1.8  million  2013 
college  graduates had at least one internship   during their college years, the highest 
percentage since the National Association o f Employers and Colleges  began keeping 
track in 2007.
8 Over the last few years, unpaid internships have made up about 48% of all 
internships and 38% of internships at for-profit companies.
9 
 
A.  A Counterintuitive Impact on Equality 
 
The characterization of unpaid internships as an attack on equal opportunity is 
perhaps the practice’s most damning critique. Assailants argue that only students with 
wealthy parents can afford to work for free, particularly at summer-long positions far 
from home and campus. A student without financial means must apply only for paid 
internships, and if she fails to secure a position, she must abandon internships for work 
outside her field.
10 Given that employers overwhelmingly cite internships as a key hiring 
factor for new graduates,
11 unpaid internships allow wealthy students to secure solid first 
rungs  on the career ladder   while  leaving  poorer students to struggle in a hostile job 
market.
12 
Despite its compelling narrative, the equal opportunity argument contains a faulty 
premise. A 2009 survey collected data from 5,735 college interns, 57% of whose families 
                                                 
7 ROSS PERLIN, INTERN NATION 32-36 (2011). 
8 NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. AND EMP’R, THE CLASS OF 2013 STUDENT SURVEY REPORT 35 (2013); Table 33, 
Projections of Education Statistics to 2021, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, 
http://perma.cc/DV3G-5KJ9 (last visited Jan. 13, 2013). 
9 NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. AND EMP’R, supra note 8, at 36; INTERN BRIDGE INC., 2012 INTERNSHIP SALARY 
REPORT 15 (2013). 
10 Jim Frederick, Internment Camp: The Intern Economy and the Culture Trust, 9 THE BAFFLER 54, 55 
(1997); Ben Yagoda, Will Work for Academic Credit, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED. (Mar. 21, 2008), 
http://perma.cc/T8LR-BVQE. 
11 MAGUIRE ASSOCIATES, THE ROLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN CAREER DEVELOPMENT: EMPLOYER 
PERCEPTIONS 11 (2012) (“An internships is the single most important credential for recent college 
graduates to have on their resume in their job search among all industry segments…”); Aoun, supra note 2 
(75% of employer want workers with applicable job experience, and more than 90% of employers favor 
past interns when making hiring decisions); Brian Burnsed, Degrees Are Great, but Internships Make a 
Difference, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 15, 2010), http://perma.cc/FF8W-YGG8 (“[E]mployers almost universally 
maintain that partaking in an internship… before graduation is integral to finding meaningful employment 
in today’s seemingly impenetrable job market.”). 
12 Magaldi and Kolisnyk, supra note 6, at 206. 4 
 
earned less than $80,000 per year.
13 Of the surveyed interns, 46% with family incomes 
below $80,000 received no p ay  while only 40% with family incomes above $80,000  
interned for free.
14 Sixty-two per cent of unpaid interns at nonprofit organizations, 61% 
in government agencies  and 58% in the for -profit sector came from families earning 
below $80,000.
15  Sixty per cent  of paid interns at nonprofit organizations, 6 0% in 
government agencies and 48% at for-profit companies came from families earning below 
$80,000.
16 
These  numbers call into question the   argument that wealthy students gain an 
unfair career advantage through access to unpaid internships. In fact, eliminating unpaid 
internships could hurt moderate-income students more than their wealthier counterparts, 
especially those  students  with aspirations in the for -profit sector.  A  ban on unpaid 
internships  would force  companies to either  begin paying their interns or annul their 
internship programs. Some employers would follow the lead of Atlantic Media (owner of 
The Atlantic magazine) and convert to paid internships, but others would take after Condé 
Nast (owner of the New Yorker and Vanity Fair, among others) and cancel their unpaid 
programs.
17 Any decline in the supply of internships would increase the competition fo r 
each position still available, a competition in which  wealthier students would have an 
advantage.
18 
  Students without experience would need to take other measures to  distinguish 
themselves, the most obvious of which is graduate school.
19 As Matthew Yglesias has 
pointed out in Slate, the financial burden of four, eight or even twelve months of unpaid 
work pales in comparison to the incredible cost of graduate school.
20 Internship expenses 
are also  small compared to most  college tuition bills, which perhaps explains  why 
moderate-income students take unpaid internships in such numbers. 
The equal opportunity argum ent is incomplete. Reforms to the law of unpaid 
internships at for-profit companies must take into account the prevalence of moderate -
income students in such internships and the likely consequences for those students should 
unpaid internships disappear. 
 
                                                 
13 PHIL GARDNER, COLLEGIATE EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A COMPARISON OF CREDIT AND NON-
CREDIT INTERNSHIPS IN THEIR EXPECTATIONS AND THE UTILIZATION OF CAMPUS RESOURCES 19 (2012). 
14 PHIL GARDNER, INTERN BRIDGE INC., THE DEBATE OVER UNPAID COLLEGE INTERNSHIPS 6 (2010). 
15 Id. at 7. 
16 Id. 
17 Atlantic Media switched to a paid internship program after learning about the muddied legality of unpaid 
internships at for-profit companies. Jeff Bercovici, ‘Atlantic’ Publisher Takes Stand on Intern Pay. Who 
Will Follow?, DAILY FINANCE (Apr. 12, 2010), http://perma.cc/4J6V-B3PD. Condé Nast cancelled its 
internship program after two former unpaid interns filed suit for back wages under the FLSA. Akane Otani, 
Former interns upset by end of Condé Nast internships, USA TODAY (Oct. 29, 2013, 8:24 PM), 
http://perma.cc/RE34-Y8J3. Other employers have also limited their unpaid programs in response to legal 
threat or uncertainty. Hilary Stout, The Coveted but Elusive Summer Internship, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2010, 
http://perma.cc/9LSU-APM4. 
18 See, e.g., GARDNER (2012), supra note 13, at 9, 21 (noting that wealthier students, especially those whose 
families earn more than $120,000, receive great help from networks of friends and family in the internship 
search). 
19 Yglesias, supra note 2. 
20 Id. 5 
 
B.  Educational Value under Unsteady Oversight 
 
  The popular image of an unpaid intern is one of scattered coffee making and 
paper filing. Indeed, some interns toil at menial tasks: they run clothing across town for 
fashion magazines, greet guests and speakers at conferences, and mail hats back and forth 
over the Atlantic.
21 Yet not all internships are so  superficial: many unpaid interns do 
substantive work, penning articles for newspapers and researching stories for magazine 
writers.
22  Overall,  unpaid  internships  lag   somewhat  behind  their  pa id  cousins  in 
professional assignments: in 2011, paid interns at for-profit entities spent 44% of their 
time on professional duties and 24% on clerical duties, while unpaid interns spent 33% of 
their time on professional duties and 31% on clerical duties.
23 
  The content requirements on unpaid internships, to the extent that they exist, flow 
predominantly from colleges. The Wage and Hour Division could police an educational 
minimum, but it has done little to enforce the law .
24 Students, as one-off players with 
limited information and precarious career positions, are unlikely to either select for 
educational quality or complain about po or experiences.
25 Colleges, on the other hand, 
are well-established repeat players, with significant influence over the talent pipeline and 
a powerful lever in the form of college credit.  
Sixty-two per cent of unpaid interns secure college credit, many because for-profit 
employers believe credit obviates FLSA liability.
26 That belief is a tool in the hands of 
colleges, who could withhold credit from internships that have little educational content. 
However, relatively few colleges take the opportunity. In 2009,  only 39% of unpaid, 
credit  interns were in regular contact with or  received a site visit from a campus 
representative  during  their  internships .
27  Only  50%  of  a  small   sample  of  colleges 
“actively put measures in place to monitor the quality of unpaid internships” (another 
20% of respondents did not know if their colleges had such measures).
28 It is difficult to 
tell whether the average school diligently oversees the educational quality of unpaid, for-
profit internships, but at best, colleges provide inconsistent supervision. 
                                                 
21 Steve Cohen, Minimum Wage for Interns? It Misses the Point, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2013, 
http://perma.cc/XE8C-E4RQ; Sanburn, supra note 3; Kaitlin van Baarle, The precarious life of kids these 
days: the unpaid internship industry, INTERN AWARE (Apr. 26, 2013), http://perma.cc/WSL4-X84Q.  
22 Cara Buckley, Sued over Pay, Condé Nast Ends Internship Program, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2013, 
http://perma.cc/B4GQ-ST5S; Connie Sung, Are Unpaid Internships Exploitive?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 
2000, http://perma.cc/7UGX-K7H8. 
23 NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. AND EMP’R, THE CLASS OF 2011 STUDENT SURVEY REPORT 42 (2011). 
24 Bennett, supra note 1, at 308-10 (documenting the Division’s lack of enforcement against illegal unpaid 
internships). 
25 See Yamada (2002), supra note 6, at 232 (arguing that interns may refrain from complaining to avoid 
souring their chances for a reference or job offer down the road); Glaeser, supra note 2 (pointing out that 
students need more information on educational quality);. 
26 INTERN BRIDGE INC. (2013), supra note 9, at 84; see also Stout, supra note 17 (“Most employers aren’t 
entirely eliminating their unpaid internship programs but are instead becoming sticklers, requiring that 
schools grant credit to any person they hire for an unpaid internship.”); Yagoda, supra note 10 (writing that 
almost all employers require unpaid interns to receive academic credit because the employers believe such 
credit eliminates minimum wage liability). 
27 GARDNER (2012), supra note 13, at 23. 
28 PHIL GARDNER, INTERN BRIDGE INC., REACTION ON CAMPUS TO UNPAID INTERNSHIP CONTROVERSY 7 
(2012). 6 
 
  Collegiate inconsistency may contribute to the most striking figures on unpaid 
internships: while 67% of 2013 seniors who completed a paid, for-profit internship had 
received at least one job offer prior to graduation, only 37% of unpaid, for-profit interns 
received a job offer — little different from the 35% of non-intern seniors with a job 
offer.
29 Even more damning,  a senior with a paid internship under her belt pegged a 
median starting salary of $51,930 while the unpaid intern secured only $35,721, less than 
the non-intern’s median starting salary of $37,087.
30  
The National Association of Colleges and Employers has cautioned analysts from 
taking the figures too much to heart, most notably because the data only discuss job 
offers earned prior to graduation; unpaid internships may still have a positive impact 
post-graduation.
31 Diagnosing the discrepancy’s source may be impossible without more 
information, but that has not stopped advocates from citing the data to claim that unpaid 
internships are both exploitative and useless, and so students would lose nothing if they 
disappeared.
32 
Yet students overwhelmingly find value in internships, even unpaid internships.
33 
When researchers actually ask students what they think of internships,  they give very 
favorable reports
34 and often express the opinion that internships are better educational 
tools than classes.
35 Eradication seems at odds with such approval. 
If unpaid internships are in fact failing to offer an immediate benefit in the job 
market, the law may respond in one of two ways: devise a legal rule that wi ll eliminate 
unpaid internships or design a test to improve the quality of unpaid internships.  While 
many writers have taken the first option,
36 it is fraught with risk: extinguishing unpaid 
                                                 
29 NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. AND EMP’R, supra note 8, at 38. 
30 Class of 2013: Paid Interns Outpace Unpaid Peers in Job Offers, Salaries, NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. AND 
EMP’R (May 29, 2013), http://perma.cc/EUD6-G9X8 (data is not available solely on interns at for-profit 
entities). 
31 Unpaid Internships: A Clarification of NACE Research, NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. AND EMP’R (Oct. 16, 
2013), http://perma.cc/588X-HYE2. 
32 Jordan Weissmann, Do Unpaid Internships Lead to Jobs? Not for College Students, ATLANTIC (June 19, 
2013, 8:30 AM), http://perma.cc/VW4P-65S5; Andrew Maguire, Unpaid Internships: Get on the Right Side 
of History, INTERNMATCH.COM (Apr. 11, 2013), http://perma.cc/LFG2-PAW5. 
33 See, e.g., Fred Beard and Linda Morton, Effects of Internship Predictors on Successful Field Experience, 
53 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. EDUCATOR 42, 48, 49 (1999) (finding that advertising and public relations 
interns “evaluated their internships very highly” and compensation did not play a large role in that 
assessment); Daniel J. Givelber et al., Learning Through Work: An Empirical Study of Legal Internship, 43 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 24, 41 (1995) (finding that “[m]ost students rated their internships extremely positively 
as educational experiences” and that compensation was not significantly related to intern ratings of 
educational quality). 
34 See, e.g., Sherry Cook et al., The Perceptions of Interns: A Longitudinal Case Study, 79 J. ED. FOR BUS. 
179, 184 (2004) (finding that interns overwhelmingly found value in their internships); Debbie A. D. C. 
Jaarsma et al., Undergraduate research internships: Veterinary students’ experiences and the relation with 
internship quality, 31 MED. TCHR. 178, 180 (2009) (reporting high satisfaction among veterinary interns); 
Thomas P. Schambach and Jim Dirks, Student Perceptions of Internship Experiences, INT’L CONF. ON 
INFORMATICS ED. RES. 1, 5 (2002) (noting that 96% of computing students agreed or strongly agreed that 
their internship provided “valuable real-world experience”). 
35 See, e.g., Jack Gault et al., Undergraduate Business Internships and Career Success: Are They Related?, 
22 J. MARKETING ED. 45, 49-50 (2000) (finding that interns viewed five core skills as better learned in an 
internship than in university and only one core skill better learned in university than in an internship). 
36 The tests in the following articles would eliminate all but a very few unpaid internships. KATHRYN ANNE 
EDWARDS AND ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, ECON. POL’Y INST., NOT-SO-EQUAL PROTECTION 7 
 
internships  would  likely  deny  experiential  education  opportunities  to  a  great  many 
moderate-income students, despite the demand for and benefits of such an education. The 
other option, the one proposed in this Note, is to regulate the educational value of unpaid 
internships in an attempt to raise their quality closer to that of paid internships. The next 
Part will explore the law one must navigate to write a legal test that will both guarantee 
educational quality and stand up in court. 
  
II.  UNPAID INTERNSHIPS UNDER THE FLSA 
 
A.  The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
 
  On June 25, 1938, after a marathon Congressional battle and under the shadow of 
a Supreme Court only recently tolerant of a minimum wage, President Roosevelt signed 
the Fair Labor Standards Act into law.
37 The Act set a minimum wage of $0.25 per hour 
(rising to $0.40 by 1945), fixed maximum hours of 44 per week (falling to 40 by 1940), 
and banned child labor.
38 Today, the Act provides for a minimum wage of $7.25 per 
hour.
39 
  The FLSA’s minimum wage requirements only apply to employees, and so the 
key FLSA question for unpaid interns is whether they are employees. An employee is 
“any individual employed by an employer.”
40 An employer, in turn, “includes any person 
acting… in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee,” while to employ is “to 
suffer or permit to work.”
41 Despite the breadth of that last definition, the courts have 
found it proper to carve out unenumerated exceptions to the Act’s coverage by excluding 
some workers from employment. One of those exceptions, Walling v. Portland Terminal 
Co.’s “trainee” exception,
42 forms the basis of unpaid intern law under the FLSA. 
 
B.  Walling v. Portland Terminal Company 
 
  Portland Terminal Company employed yard brakemen to operate a railway yard.
43 
To train new brakemen, the railroad  assigned job applicants to work crews, where an 
applicant learned his duties first by observation and then by  actual operation under the 
watchful eye of a regular brakeman.
44 The length of the training course depended on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
REFORMING THE REGULATION OF STUDENT INTERNSHIPS 4 (2010) (pitching a test under which the unpaid 
intern is an employee if the employer’s financial benefit is greater than its financial cost); Curiale, supra 
note 3, at 122 (proposing, under a mistaken view of the Division’s formal rulemaking powers, a Division 
rulemaking to convert the six-factor test into an all-or-nothing test with Chevron deference); Durrant, supra 
note 5, at 187-88 (suggesting that an unpaid intern should be an employee whenever the employer seeks a 
present or future benefit from the intern). 
37 Willis J. Nordlund, A Brief History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 39 LAB. L. J. 715, 718, 720-21 
(1988). 
38 Id. at 721; Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum 
Wage, 101 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 22, 28 (1978). 
39 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §206(a)(1)(C) (2013). 
40 29 U.S.C. §203(e)(1). 
41 29 U.S.C. §203(d), (g). 
42 330 U.S. 148 (1947). 
43 Id. at 149.  
44 Id. 8 
 
aptitude of the trainee, but successful students took seven or eight days on average to 
complete  the  training.
45  The railroad did not pay trainees during the training period, 
though as of October 1943 it paid a retroactive wage of four dollars per day to trainees 
who earned certification and joined the list of available brakemen.
46 
  The Court decided that the trainees were not ‘employees’ under the FLSA and so 
were not entitled to the minimum wage during the training period,
47 though the Court was 
not clear as to which factors led to that determination.  The Court noted that the trainees 
did not displace employed brakemen, as brakemen closely supervised trainee tasks.
48 The 
railroad never promised and the trainees never expected any compensation,  important 
since  the Act aimed to guarantee a minimum wage  in  positions  that  “contemplated 
compensation.”
49  The  railroad’s  training  program  was  similar  to  that  offered  in  a 
vocational school, yet schools do not owe their students a wage.
50 Rather than assist the 
company,  the  trainees  “may,  and  sometime  do[],  actually  impede  and  retard”  the 
company’s work, presumably due to their inexperience.
51 Indeed, that lack of assistance 
may  have  been  dispositive:  “Accepting…  that  the  railroads  receive  no  ‘immediate 
advantage’ from any work done by the trainees, we hold that they are not employees 
within the Act’s meaning.”
52 
  The assorted factors and their relative weights have garnered the most attention in 
separating employees from trainees. Yet the spirit of the opinion is best captured in the 
line, “But  broad as  [the definitions  of ‘employ’ and ‘employee’] are, they cannot  be 
interpreted so as to make a person whose work serves only his own interest an employee 
of  another  person  who  gives  him  aid  and  instruction.”
53  The  Court  conceived  of  an 
exception wherein employers who sought not to elude the law but to educate novices 
without charge could avoid liability for such admirable behavior.
54 In the years following, 
however, and despite good intentions, the Wage and Hour Division and the lower courts 
turned the sensible exception into an exploitable loophole. 
 
C.  Fact Sheet #71 
 
Since at least 1967, the Wage and Hour Division has said that a person is not an 
employee  under  the  FLSA  if  her  work  relationship  meets  six  criteria  derived  from 
Portland Terminal.
55 In some early applications of the six-factor trainee test, the Division 
appeared to hold the position that even one missi ng factor produced an employment 
relationship  under the Act
56  —  a  rigid  stance  that  might  have  severely  curtailed  the 
                                                 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 150. 
47 Id. at 153. 
48 Id. at 150. 
49 Id. at 150, 152. 
50 Id. at 152-53. 
51 Id. at 150. 
52 Id. at 153. 
53 Id. at 152. 
54 Id. at 153. 
55 Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting the test’s use since at least 
1967); WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK 10b11 (1993) (the same test). 
56 See, e.g., Wage and Hour Division, Op. Ltr., Oct. 7, 1975 (“Where all six of the criteria are not met, the 
students or trainees will be regarded as employees. This would be true, for example, where the student has 9 
 
relevance  of  the  trainee  exception  to  internships.  In  other  applications,  however,  the 
Division retained the flexibility of a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, permitting a 
more subjective determination of when people can work for free.
57 In April 2010, the 
Division released Fact Sheet #71, which laid out the six-factor test for interns in almost 
identical language to that of the trainee test (not much of a surprise, as the Division had 
applied the trainee test to interns for decades
58).
59 Under the Division’s interpretation, an 
unpaid intern at a for-profit company
60 is not an employee under the FLSA if: 
 
1)  The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the 
employer,  is  similar  to  training  that  would  be  given  in  an  educational 
environment; 
2)  The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern; 
3)  The  intern  does  not  displace  regular  employees,  but  works  under  close 
supervision of existing staff; 
4)  The employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from 
the activities of the intern; and on occasion its operations may actually be 
impeded; 
5)  The  intern  is  not  necessarily  entitled  to  a  job  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
internship; and 
6)  The employer and the intern understand that the intern is not entitled to wages 
for the time spent in the internship.
61 
 
The Fact Sheet does little to clarify whether the failure to meet a single factor will 
result in classification as an employee. On the one hand, the  Fact Sheet notes that, “The 
determination of whether an internship or training program meets [the trainee] exclusion 
depends on all of the facts and circumstances of each such program.”
62 On the other 
hand, the Fact Sheet closes the test by writing that, “If all of the factors listed above are 
met, an employment relationship does not exist under the FLSA” — hinting at an all-or-
nothing approach in which the absence of even one factor is dispositive.
63 
                                                                                                                                                 
been promised a job at the conclusion of the training program.”); Wage and Hour Division, WH-20, Op. 
Ltr., Feb. 22, 1974 (“If all of the following criteria apply, the trainees are not considered employees within 
the meaning of the Act.”). 
57 See, e.g., Wage and Hour Division, Op. Ltr., May 1, 1996 (If all of the [six] criteria are met, an employer 
would not be required to pay wages to a trainee enrolled in a training program. If, however, some of the 
above criteria are not met, it is still possible that a trainee would not be an employee under the FLSA; 
however, all of the facts and circumstance would have to be considered.”). 
58 See Wage and Hour Division, Op. Ltr., Mar. 27, 1986 (firefighting interns). 
59 WAGE AND HOUR DIV., DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #71: INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS UNDER THE FAIR 
LABOR STANDARDS ACT 1 (2010), available at http://perma.cc/JR5Q-G2KL. 
60 Fact Sheet #71’s footnote reads: “Unpaid internships in the public sector and for non-profit charitable 
organizations, where the intern volunteers without expectation of compensation, are generally permissible.” 
Id. at 1. The law of volunteers in the public and non-profit sectors is beyond the scope of this Note. For an 
analysis, see Anthony J. Tucci, Note, Worthy Exemption? Examining How the DOL Should Apply the FLSA 
to Unpaid Interns at Nonprofits and Public Agencies, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1363 (2012). This Note discusses 
the law of the trainee exception, the only exception under which an unpaid interns at for-profit company 
may fall. 
61 FACT SHEET #71, supra note 59, at 1. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 10 
 
In  practice,  the  Division’s  choice  of  approach  depends  on  the  blessing  of  an 
educational institution.
64 The Fact Sheet’s commentary on the educational environment 
factor notes that the Division will often classify an internship “as an extension of [an] 
individual’s  educational  experience”  rather  than  a  job  when  “a  college  or  university 
exercises oversight over the internship program and provides educational credit.”
65 That 
commentary applies to only the first factor in the test, and the Fact Sheet goes on to 
emphasize  other  factors:  the  restriction  on  “productive  work,”  the  ban  on  employee 
displacement  and  the  requirement  of  extra  supervision,  among  others.
66  However,  as 
demonstrated below, those latter criteria only become the subjects of searching inquiry 
when no educational institution has sanctioned the work arrangement. When, instead, an 
internship has academic backing, the Division conducts a cursory analysis, relying on the 
school to ensure legitimacy. The  Division, de facto, has two tests: a stringent one for 
internships without a link to a school, and a lax one for those with such a link. 
 
D.  Wage and Hour Opinion Letters 
 
  To demonstrate the pattern in the Division’s analysis, this section reviews selected 
opinion letters from a search for those that include the word “trainee.”
67 The Division 
scrutinizes adherence to the six factors in work relationships without an academic link. In 
a  letter  to  a  food  service  training  program  for  people  with  disabilities,  the  Division 
detailed  the  program’s  failure  to  meet  criteria  three  (no  displacement  of  regular 
employees),  four  (no  immediate  advantage),  and  six  (understanding  that  position  is 
unpaid).
68 In another case, the Division examined a summer program that aimed to build 
employment skills in low-income youth, asking  for specifics on the supervision and 
educational benefits of the program.
69 
In inspecting work relationships with an academic link, however,  the Division 
often approves non-payment of wages after only a cursory analysis . For example, the 
Division received a letter describ ing a firm’s plan to host interior design students for 
ninety to one hundred hours of supervised work, completion of which was a requirement 
for graduation.
70 In response, the Division wrote that it would “not assert that a student 
studying to become an interior designer is an employee of a firm when engaged in on-
the-job training or work experience which is a prescribed part of the curriculum.”
71 In 
another case, the Division stated that a corporate law office did not have to pay students 
                                                 
64 David Yamada has noted that the Division’s analysis is more favorable to internships connected to 
academic programs. Yamada (2002), supra note 5, at 229-230. See also Debra D. Burke and Robert Carton, 
The Pedagogical, Legal, and Ethical Implications of Unpaid Internships, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. ED. 99, 113 
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65 FACT SHEET #71, supra note 59, at 2. 
66 Id. 
67 The author searched the Westlaw database, which includes some opinion letters from January 1970 and 
all opinion letters from 1989 to 2009 (when the Division stopped writing FLSA letters). The author 
reviewed all letters in the database that include the word “trainee.” 
68 Wage and Hour Division, Op. Ltr., Jan. 17, 1986. 
69 Wage and Hour Division, FLSA2002-8, Op. Ltr., Sept. 5, 2002. 
70 Wage and Hour Division, WH-20, Op. Ltr., Mar. 31, 1970. 
71 Id. 11 
 
taking part in an externship program but would have to pay graduates working in the 
exact same program.
72 
The Division does not automatically approve every pro gram connected to a 
school. For example, it  rejected a claim that unp aid sewing machine students   who 
produced glove inserts  were  trainees  of a glove-manufacturing firm.
73  However,  the 
Division’s  concluding  lines  in  response  to  this  egregious  violation  were  far  from 
damning: “We have assisted many communities in complying with the above guidelines 
while using vocational schools to create reservoirs of trained manpower. We are certain 
that, with only a few changes in the vocational program, [the firm] will be able to use its 
schools in its industrial development program.”
74  
Other school-connected initiatives have earned inspection: in 2004, the Division 
examined and rejected a marketing program that would have seen unpaid college students 
wearing company logos, surveying fellow students, distributing flyers and forecasting 
trends, all for college credit and under faculty supervision.
75 Despite some inconsistency, 
however, the Division shows a marked leniency toward  those work relationships with a 
connection to an educational institution. That leniency has its fullest expression among 
the lower courts, where an institutional link almost without exception buys a pass on the 
minimum wage. 
 
E.  In the Lower Courts 
 
Although the courts speak in terms of a contest between the six-factor test and a 
primary benefit test in deciding unpaid work cases under the FLSA,
76 that contest is an 
illusion. In fact, the core determinant is the involvement of an educational institution ; 
once that factor comes into view, the apparent circuit split disappears.
77 The reliance on 
academic institutions has significant ramifications for the future development of the  law 
and  for  the  possibilities  for   reform.  This  section  reviews  selected  cases  from  a 
comprehensive search of all FLSA cases in which the court analyzed a work placement’s 
educational benefits to decide if a person was an employee. 
In  1998,  then-District  Court  Judge  Sonia  Sotomayor  held  that  homeless  and 
formerly  homeless  people  participating  in  an  employment  experience  program  were 
                                                 
72 Wage and Hour Division, Op. Ltr., Jan. 28, 1988. 
73 Wage and Hour Division, Op. Ltr., Feb. 22, 1974. 
74 Id. 
75 Wage and Hour Division, FLSA2004-5NA, Op. Ltr., May 17, 2004; See also Wage and Hour Division, 
Op. Ltr., Dec. 6, 1994 (evaluating the possibility of an immediate advantage to the hosts of at-risk students 
in a public school program); Wage and Hour Division, Op. Ltr., Oct. 7, 1975 (giving guidance on the level 
of supervision, length of job placement and work complexity permitted in a high school career experience 
program). 
76 See, e.g., Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525-29 (6th Cir. 2011); Glatt v. 
Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 531-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Reich v. Shiloh True Light 
Church of Christ, 895 F.Supp. 799, 817-18 (W.D.N.C. 1995). 
77 For assertions of a circuit split, see, for example, David C. Yamada, The Legal and Social Movement 
Against Unpaid Internships, NORTHEASTERN UNIV. L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 9-10) (“[I]t appears 
inevitable that there will remain splits among the federal circuits on [the unpaid intern question].”); 
Bennett, supra note 1, at 305 (“The courts have not defined a single clear test to determine whether a 
person is an employee.”); Curiale, supra note 3, at 117 (noting the “circuit split” among trainee cases). 12 
 
employees under the FLSA.
78 The program, designed to build a work history and job 
skills, placed participants in entry -level jobs inside and outside  the employer’s social 
service facility.
79 Though “[t]here is no doubt that the [program] participants… benefitted 
enormously  from  the  work  opportunities  provided  by  the  [non-profit  employer],”  the 
employer’s  cost-savings  and  profits  on  outside contracts  outweighed  the  participants’ 
gains.
80  The  court  appreciated  “the  attractive  nature  of  the  [employer’s]  program  in 
serving the needs of the homeless,” but it could not stand absent a minimum wage.
81 
In cases of academic endorsement, on the other hand, courts uncritically credit the 
employer’s assertion of educational value and trivialization of its own benefit. The Sixth 
Circuit in the 2011 case Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School
82 decided that high 
school students engaged in revenue-generating tasks at a religious boarding school were 
not employees.
83 Laurelbrook students grew flowers, fixed cars, and performed medical 
services  in  the sanitarium ,  all  activities f rom  which  Laurelbrook derived   income.
84 
However, the court found that the students’ practical training, high level of supervision, 
inculcation of discipline and other “intangible” benefits, and “opportunity to obtain [a 
hands-on]  education  in  an  environment  consistent  with  their  beliefs”  overrode  the 
school’s monetary profit.
85 
Marshall v. Regis Educational Corporation
86 dealt with student resident assistants 
(“RAs”) at a private college who undertook administrative jobs, kept order in the resident 
halls, encouraged residents to take part in campus activities, and offered peer counselling 
in exchange for a $1,000 tuition grant and lower rent.
87 The Department of Labor argued 
that the “RA’s were employees because their services had an immediate economic impact 
on the ‘business’ of operating a college.”
88 The Tenth Circuit thought that perspective “so 
limited as to ignore not only the broad educational purpose of this private liberal arts 
college, but also the expressed educational objectives of the student resident assistant 
program.”
89 Without explaining what those educational objectives might be, the court 
held that the RAs were not employees under the FLSA.
90 
Though most cases fall along the educational institution dividing line, a few, such 
as Marshall v. Baptist Hospital, Inc.,
91 do not. The Baptist Hospital court found that 
radiology students who undertook a two-year training program of courses and practical 
                                                 
78 Archie v. Grand Cent. Partnership, Inc., 997 F.Supp. 504, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). For related findings of 
employment, see Wirtz v. Wardlaw, 339 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1964); Bailey v. Pilots’ Ass’n for the Bay and 
River Del., 406 F.Supp. 1302 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
79 Archie, 997 F.Supp. at 509-10, 535. 
80 Id. at 533, 535. 
81 Id. at 508.  
82 642 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2011). For related findings of no employment, see Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823 
(8th Cir. 2005); Lane v. Carolina Beauty Sys., Inc., No. 6:90CV00108, 1992 WL 228868 (M.D.N.C. July 2, 
1992); Bobilin v. Bd. of Educ., State of Haw., 403 F.Supp. 1095 (D. Haw. 1975). 
83 Laurelbrook, 624 F.3d at 532. 
84 Id. at 530. 
85 Id. at 531-32. 
86 666 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1981). 
87 Id. at 1026. 
88 Id. at 1027. 
89 Id. at 1027. 
90 Id. at 1028. But cf. Marshall v. Marist College, 1977 WL 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding that RAs in very 
similar circumstances were employees under the FLSA). 
91 473 F.Supp. 465 (M.D. Tenn. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 668 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1981). 13 
 
experience  at  a  hospital  were  employees.
92  The  court  cited  th e  basic  absence   of 
supervision, the lack of rotation between different procedures, the routine nature of many 
tasks, and the enormous quantity of clerical work as  aspects of a “deficient” training 
program.
93  But  Marshall  is  an  outlier  in  its  criticism  and  rejection  of  a  program 
connected to a school. 
Unpaid internships finally made it into FLSA decisions in 2012 and 2013, yet 
despite the media buzz
94 around Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc.,
95 the new cases 
did  not  alter  the  basic  pattern  of  analysis.  Eric  Glatt  and  Alex  Footman  carried  out 
administrative jobs for the film Black Swan, handling paychecks, writing cover letters, 
and answering phones.
96 No party alleged an academic  connection; in fact, both interns 
had already graduated from college.
97 In applying the six-factor test to decide that Glatt 
and Footman  were employees,  the  court insisted  on a high  standard of educational 
validity:  “[t]he  benefits  [the  interns]  may  have  received…  are  the  results  of  simply 
having worked as any other employee works, not of internships designed to be uniquely 
educational to the interns and of little utility to the employer.”
98 
Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc.
99 illustrated the continued vitality of 
the educational connection. Risa Kaplan and Linda O’Neill took unpaid internships
100 at 
for-profit employers to fulfill the internship requirement of their Medical Billing and 
Coding Specialist program.
101 In a perfunctory opinion with little factual analysis, the 
Eleventh Circuit dismissed the value of the interns’ activity and emphasized the benefits 
of “academic credit” and “[satisfaction of] a precondition of graduation.”
102 In a review 
of summary judgment against the interns, the court noted that, “[a]lthough Kaplan and 
O’Neill argue that their [internship] experiences were of little educational benefit, they 
did in fact engage in hands-on work for their formal degree program.”
103 
The  Southern  District  of  Florida  made  an  even  stronger  statement  on  the 
relevancy  of  an  academic  connection  in  Demayo  v.  Palms  West  Hospital,  Limited 
Partnership.
104 The Demayo court decided that Toni Demayo, a surgical technologist 
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94 See, e.g., Tovia Smith, Unpaid No More: Interns Win Major Court Battle, NPR (June 13, 2013), 
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95 293 F.R.D. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
96 Id. at 533. 
97 Id. at 526-27; Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, 
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 11 Civ. 6784). 
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99 504 Fed.Appx. 831 (11th Cir. 2013). 
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Externship v. Internship, INTERNMATCH BLOG (Oct. 3, 2011), http://perma.cc/HX5H-SXSF. Since no party 
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101 Kaplan, 504 Fed.Appx. at 833-34. 
102 Id. at 835. 
103 Id. at 834. 
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student completing an unpaid internship required for her degree, was not an employee.
105 
Compared to the Glatt court’s demands, the court in Demayo set a very low educational 
threshold: 
The gist of Plaintiff's argument to the contrary rests in the fact that she 
performed nonsurgical work, such as stocking instruments and supplies, 
organizing files, and taking out the garbage…. While this type of work 
may, generally, be the type of work covered by the FLSA, it is part-in-
parcel  to  the  tasks  a  surgical  technologist  performs.  And,  the  central 
purpose of Plaintiff's externship was to perform the work of a surgical 
technologist—that  is,  of  course,  the  very  reason  she  attended  [her 
college].
106 
 
This survey excluded cases in which the unpaid time consisted of training for a 
paid job to begin immediately or sho rtly after the  training. Cases such as  Donovan v. 
American  Airlines,  Inc.
107  and  Reich  v.  Parker  Fire  Protection  District
108  have  been 
central to unpaid internship scholarship
109 and shed light on judicial  treatment of the 
Division’s six-factor test, but they do not reveal courts’ central concerns in unpaid work 
placements  like  internships.  Conventional  training  programs  are  easy  cases  —  the 
trainees do not displace employees, do not perform productive work, and often receive 
training in a classroom — and courts most often find no employment relationship.
110 
Work placements such as internships, where productive contribution in a job setting is the 
norm and often the point, are much more difficult to classify under the FLSA. 
No court grounds its opinion explicitly in an academic connection or lack thereof. 
The significance of the factor emerges only through the results, the styles of analysis, and 
the swings in the judicial attitude perceptible across a full collection of the cases.  But 
while subtle in its expression, the deference accorded to the academy is profound: a wide 
gulf separates Glatt’s exacting verdict that the internships were “a far cry from Walling 
[v. Portland Terminal]” from Kaplan’s wholly conclusory review.
111 
 
III.  AN EDUCATIONAL INQUIRY TEST 
 
A.  Educational Value, the Underlying Metric 
 
  The  source  of  schools’  sway  over  the  legality  of  unpaid  internships  lies  in 
administrative  and  judicial  concern  over  educational  value.  Several  Division  opinion 
letters note that the Division will not assert an employment relationship in a school-
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109 See, e.g., Yamada (2002), supra note 6, at 230-31; Curiale, supra note 3, at 112-13. 
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sanctioned internship if the internship offers “professional experience in the furtherance 
of [the students’] education,”
112 “involves the students in real life situations and provides 
the students with educational experiences unobtainable in a classroom setting.”
113 The 
Regis  court  repeatedly  noted  the  “educational  benefits”  of  the  resident  assistant 
program,
114 while the Baptist Hospital court laid out in great detail five reasons that the 
radiology training program was not educationally valid.
115 In Demayo, the court relied on 
the  instructional  worth  of  the  comprehensive  technologist  experience  to  find  that the 
student  was  not  an  employee.
116  The  Division  and  the  courts  believ e  that  unpaid 
placements of educational quality are valuable and deserve an exception from the FLSA. 
Administrative  and  judicial  decision -makers  are  not  experts  in  education , 
however, and so put their   faith in academic institutions . Though they do not say  so 
directly, decision-makers’ favor for internships with an academic connection appears to 
stem from the theory that schools are better placed to judge educational merit. If an 
internship has the blessing of a college, it must be worthwhile, and so it will receive only 
minor scrutiny under the FLSA. If an internship does not have such approval, however, it 
is suspect and must withstand the rigors of close administrative or judicial analysis. The 
significance of the school connection thus springs from good intentions on the part of the 
Division and the courts: it is an attempt to put the judgment of educational value in the 
hands of those best able to make it. 
 
B.  Skewed Academic Incentives 
 
The Division and the courts, however, should not rely on a third party that has a 
financial  interest  in  promoting  unpaid  internships.  Many  colleges  have  pecuniary 
motivations  in  deciding  whether  to  approve  unpaid  internships:  of  the  interns  that 
received credit in a 2009 survey, 76% paid tuition for those credits.
117 Colleges, whether 
public, private non-profit or private for-profit, reap rewards when they earn tuition dollars 
that demand little or no expenditure.  Public or private, more money means higher 
salaries,  expanded  campuses,  better  programs  and  greater  status.  The  temptation 
interferes with the educational judgment on which the Division and the courts count.  
The backgrounds of Kaplan and Demayo furnish a dramatic example of scholarly 
greed at a for-profit institution. Kaplan and O’Neill attended the MedVance Institute’s 
Medical Billing and Coding Specialist program, while Demayo completed the surgical 
technologist program  at  MedVance.
118 MedVance  is a for-profit  college that  recently 
changed its name to the Fortis Institute upon joining the  Fortis network.
119 In 2012, the 
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college agreed to provide free retraining for former students and a $600,000 payment into 
scholarship funds to end a deceptive marketing investigation by the Florida Attorney 
General.
120 Also in the last few years, two groups of students  sued MedVance/Fortis in 
separate suits,  alleging “fraud in the inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation,” “false 
statements  regarding  the  quality  of  education,  accreditation  of  Fortis,  graduates’ 
preparedness  to  pass  the  required  certification  examination  and  job  prospects  upon 
graduation.”
121 The courts dismissed the student suits due to arbitration clauses,
122 though 
one court recognized that “there are serious questions about whether Plaintiffs received 
the  benefit  of  their  bargains.”
123  The  student  suits,  in  combination  with  the  Florida 
Attorney  General  investigation  and  allegations  in  Kaplan  that  MedVance  provided 
virtually no oversight of their internships,
124 at least suggest that MedVance/Fortis was 
willing to put its bottom line above quality education. 
Despite the number of interns that pay for credit and the burden of that outlay , 
many colleges, by their own admission, fail to keep a  close eye on internships.
125 While 
theoretically in the best position to figure out the caliber of an internship, the financial 
incentives to maintain a lax approval process call academic evaluation into question, and 
the relatively low contact rates confirm a lack of oversight. As long as schools gain from 
their assent to unpaid internships, administrative and judici al decision-makers interested 
in educational quality should not defer to schools’ assertions of value. 
 
C.  An Educational Inquiry Test 
 
  If  the  Division  and  courts  cannot  rely  on  the  academy  to  determine  the 
educational quality of unpaid internships, the  administrators and judges must analyze 
quality themselves. Measuring educational value directly will produce results that better 
track the Division and the courts’ core interest. While administrators and judges perhaps 
lack specific training in measuring learning, the absence of a reliable third-party requires 
them to step into the fray. The Division should promulgate and the courts should adopt 
the following test to replace Fact Sheet #71. 
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Fed.Appx. 831 (11th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-12679-BB, 12-12011-BB, 12-12376-BB). (“MedVance provided 
no guidance to [the intern host] and made no efforts to ensure the [internships] were educational and 
consisted useful vocational training. Medvance provided no on-site supervision during the [internship].”).  
125 See supra Part I.C; see also Burke and Carton, supra note 64, at 129 (noting, seemingly from personal 
experience, that universities pass off internship oversight to faculty who provide little or no actual 
supervision); Ross Perlin, Unpaid Interns, Complicit Colleges, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 2011, 
http://perma.cc/GGP6-U2Z4 (“[A]dvisers I spoke to flatly denied being able to “monitor and reassess” all 
placements or even postings…, their ability to visit students’ workplaces, for instance, is almost nil. They 
described feeling caught between the demands of employers and interns…”). 17 
 
The  test  will  help  the  Division  and  the  courts  carry  out  their  assessments  of 
educational value in line with the literature on internship design. In the pursuit of a valid 
and rigorous tool for educational assessment, every factor cites evidence from empirical 
studies on internship education.
126 The test’s goal is to compel for-profit companies that 
offer  unpaid,  menial  internships  to  either  reform  their  internships  into  educational 
positions or pay their interns. 
  
Educational  Inquiry  Test:  An  individual  who  interns  at  a  for-profit  entity  and 
understands that she is not entitled to pay may be a trainee and not an employee under 
the  Fair  Labor  Standards  Act  if  the  relationship  between  the  intern  and  the  host 
company is one of an instructor-learner. The determination of an instructor-learner 
relationship depends upon all of the facts and circumstances of the internship. The 
following  criteria  are  highly  relevant  to  the  question  of  the  instructor-learner 
relationship. 
 
1)  Duration: The internship lasts six months or less, irrespective of the number of 
hours worked. The company tailors the length of the internship to fit the quantity 
and difficulty of the skills taught. 
2)  Work 
a.  Challenging  Projects:  The  intern  works  on  projects  that  challenge  the 
intern’s skills.
127 
b.  Autonomy: The intern works independently at least some of the time.
128 
c.  Skill Variety: The intern uses a variety of different skills in her work.
129 
d.  Interpersonal Interaction: The intern works with a variety of people.
130 
                                                 
126 The paper cites studies that show a correlation between an internship characteristic and intern 
satisfaction under the assumption that interns take internships to learn and that therefore the more satisfied 
the intern, the more educational the internship. In addition, the paper cites studies that show a correlation 
between an internship characteristic and intern perception of educational quality. Although neither measure 
is perfect, other measures are rare and no measure flawlessly calculates educational quality. The paper 
proceeds on the basis that empirical data, however unpolished, is more accurate than hunches as to what 
constitutes an educational internship. For a defense of student perception of educational quality, see 
Givelber et al., supra note 33, at 21-22. 
127 Caroline P. D’Abate et al., Making the Most of an Internship: An Empirical Study of Internship 
Satisfaction, 8 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EVALUATION 527, 534 (2009) (finding students with projects 
that have a significant impact on the organization more likely to rate their internship highly); Marlene A. 
Dixon et al., Challenge is Key: An Investigation of Affective Organizational Commitment in Undergraduate 
Interns, 80 J. ED. FOR BUS.172, 178 (2005) (finding “job challenge [among sports interns] held a 
significant, positive, and rather strong association with affective organizational commitment”); Miriam 
Rothman, Lessons Learned: Advice to Employers From Interns, 82 J. ED. FOR BUS. 140, 142 (2007). 
128 Daniel C. Feldman and Barton A. Weitz, Summer Interns: Factors Contributing to Positive 
Developmental Experiences, 37 J. OF VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 267, 279 (1990) (finding autonomy 
significantly correlated with job satisfaction, internal motivation and organizational commitment); Jaarsma 
et al., supra note 34, at 181 (finding “ability to work independently” highly prized among interns); M. 
Susan Taylor, Effects of College Internships on Individual Participants, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 393, 399 
(1988) (finding autonomy significantly related to ease of the school-work transition). 
129 Feldman and Weitz, supra note 128, at 279 (finding skill variety significantly correlated with intern job 
satisfaction). 
130 Linda Brooks et al., The Relation of Career-Related Work or Internship Experiences to the Career 
Development of College Seniors, 46 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 332, 344 (1995) (finding dealing with others 
significantly correlated with self-perceptions of career efficacy); Feldman and Weitz, supra note 128, at 18 
 
3)  Supervision
131 and Structure 
a.  Formality: The intern takes part in a formal internship program with a 
structured training component.
132 
b.  Expectations: The supervisor sets clear expectations.
133 
c.  Access: The supervisor is accessible to the intern to solve problems and 
provide guidance.
134 
d.  Feedback: The supervisor provides regular feedback on job performance 
to the intern.
135 
 
An intern is a trainee and not an employee when, taken as a whole, the criteria above 
indicate an instructor-learner relationship. An intern’s receipt of academic credit from 
an educational institution is not an educational benefit to the intern and is not evidence 
of an instructor-learner relationship between the intern and the host company. 
 
In  some  cases,  particular  criteria  will  not  be  relevant  to  the  determination  of  an 
instructor-learner relationship. For example, the level of interpersonal interaction may 
not be relevant to the educational quality of a research internship. The ultimate inquiry 
is for an instructor-learner relationship; the criteria are strong but not exclusive guides 
in that inquiry. 
 
D.  Educational Inquiry within the Legal Framework 
 
The FLSA, by both its text and its legislative history, permits little administrative 
discretion over its terms. The Act contains no general rulemaking power; it permits the 
Division’s  Administrator  or  the  Secretary  of  Labor  to  make  regulations,  orders  or 
determinations only in specific instances.
136 The story of its drafting and passage is one 
                                                                                                                                                 
279 (finding dealing with others significantly correlated with intern job satisfaction, job involvement and 
organizational commitment). 
131 Beard and Morton, supra note 33, at 50 (finding “quality of supervision is the most important single… 
variable” in predicting whether a journalism student will report a good internship experience); Jaarsma et 
al., supra note 34, at 182 (“[supervision] appears to be associated both with the quality of research reports 
and with overall satisfaction”). But Dixon et al., supra note 127 at 178 (finding supervisor support not 
significantly related to affective organizational commitment); Taylor, supra note 128, at 398 (finding 
supervision quality not significantly related to the ease of the school-work transition). 
132 Feldman and Weitz, supra note 128, at 275, 280 (finding formal programs and structured training 
significantly correlated with intern job satisfaction and organizational commitment). 
133 Givelber et al., supra note 33, at 41 (finding law interns whose supervisors created and kept to 
agreements on expectations were more likely give their internships a high educational rating); Jaarsma et 
al., supra note 34, at 181 (2009) (noting that interns recommended employer improvement in “clarity of 
expectations”). 
134 Givelber et al., supra note 33, at 41 (finding law interns who experienced repeated difficulty attempting 
to clarify a task were much more likely give their internships a low educational rating). 
135 Brooks et al., supra note 130, at 344 (1995) (finding feedback significantly related to self-concept 
crystallization and self-perception of career efficacy); D’Abate et al., supra note 127, at 534 (finding 
students who received feedback were more likely to rate their internship highly). 
136 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §211(d) (the Administrator may write regulations or orders “regulating, restricting, 
or prohibiting industrial homework… to prevent the circumvention or evasion of… the minimum wage 
rate”); 29 U.S.C. §212(d) (under the child labor section, “the Secretary may by regulation require 
employers to obtain from any employee proof of age”).  19 
 
of almost continuous cutback on administrative discretion in favor of rigid Congressional 
terms.
137 Under United States v. Mead Corporation,
138 the fact that Congress did not 
delegate “authority… generally to make rules carrying the force of law” in the Act means 
that an administrative interpretation of “employ” cannot earn Chevron deference, as the 
Act does not provide specific authority to the Administrator or the Secretary to interpret 
the word.
139 In Skidmore v. Swift & Company,
140 the Supreme Court decided that while 
the Administrator’s interpretation of the Act is not binding on a court, it is persuasive 
authority dependent “upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of 
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”
141 Therefore, the courts 
will only follow a new Division test if they find it persuasive within the legal and policy 
context of Portland Terminal and later administrative and judicial statements.
142 
The  educational  inquiry  test  finds  its  roots  in  a  fuller  reading  of  Portland 
Terminal than that usually considered by the Division or the courts. Portland Terminal 
centered on the idea that a person who works under another’s “aid and instruction” for 
her  own  benefit  is  not  an  employee.
143  It noted that the FLSA did not compel   “all 
instructors… [to] pay minimum wages to all learners.”
144 It underlined the educational 
process, in which the trainee “is turned over to a yard crew for instruction.... [where] he 
first learns the routine activities by observation, and is then gradually permitted to do 
actual work under close scrutiny.”
145 The Court compared the trainee’s gains favorably to 
those  of  students  at  vocational  schools,  noting  that  the  FLSA  should  not  deter 
organizations that provide free of charge vocational training for which students would 
otherwise have to pay tuition.
146 
  The six-factor test is a bright-line rule-based reading of Portland Terminal, one 
that only somewhat meshes with the opinion’s attempt to put educational relationships 
outside the strictures of the FLSA. The test consists of elements that the Court found 
useful but did not claim were necessary. For example, the most common evaluation under 
either the six-factor or the primary benefit test is a comparison of the parties’ benefits, a 
focus  given  weight  by  the  six-factor  test’s  criteria  on  the  trainee’s  gain  and  the 
employer’s immediate advantage. The Court, however, never held up relative benefit as 
the essential yardstick; instead, the Court delved into the whole transaction and reasoned 
that Congress could not possibly have meant to place instructor-learner relationships, 
whether in a school or on the shop floor, under the purview of the FLSA.
147 Relative 
benefit is a clue to the relationship’s character, not a factor of standalone importance. 
Portland  Terminal’s  holistic  examination  is  better  conducted  under  the  educational 
                                                 
137 Grossman, supra note 38, at 25-28; John S. Forsythe, Note, Legislative History of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 6 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 464, 466-73 (1939). 
138 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
139 Id. at 226-27; 29 U.S.C. §203(g). 
140 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
141 Id. at 139-40. 
142 See Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011) (analyzing 
deferral to the six-factor test under Skidmore). 
143 Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1947). 
144 Id. at 152. 
145 Id. at 149. 
146 Id. at 153. 
147 Id. at 152-53. 20 
 
inquiry test than through a sorting and weighing of each party’s tangible and intangible 
benefits. 
  The  Division  and  the  courts,  apart  from  Portland  Terminal,  should  find  the 
educational inquiry test persuasive under the Skidmore standard because it comports with 
the consistent driver of their decisions, educational value. The Division and the courts 
have always maintained that the educational value of an internship is key to the question 
of employment, but they have measured that value through a proxy — fitting at first 
glance but upon closer inspection biased and inattentive. The point of the educational 
inquiry test is not to radically reform unpaid internship law but instead to align the legal 
analysis with educational value. The result will be a more coherent regulatory scheme 
that better meets the interests of unpaid interns and decision-makers. The Division and 
the courts may welcome such a change. 
 
E.  An Approach, Not a Directive 
 
  The educational inquiry test is more useful for its approach than for its specific 
factors. The test asks the Division and courts to assess directly the educational value of an 
unpaid internship through the lens of evidence-based factors. The factors that define an 
instructor-learner relationship may vary over time, as research and theories of learning 
evolve and add to the Division’s understanding. The basic principle of searching inquiry 
into educational value, however, is constant. 
The main practical hindrance to the educational inquiry test is the lack of a firm 
line beyond which the intern is an employee. Internships come in all shapes and sizes, 
with varying degrees of challenge, structure, and feedback. With more than a half-dozen 
metrics  against  which  to  measure  an  internship,  application  of  the  test  might  be 
unpredictable or, worse, at the mercy of the decision-maker’s biases. Many argue that if 
the Division is to adopt a new internship test, it should strive for one that sets a hard and 
fast distinction between employment and training.
148 
  The  reform-oriented  literature  on  unpaid  internships  shies  away  from  direct 
evaluation of educational value.
149 This is not surprising: assessing educational quality is 
difficult; proxies and hardline tests are easier to handle.  Yet Portland Terminal takes a 
comprehensive look at the educational program on offer exactly because measuring a 
single quantifiable factor does not do justice to the variety of ways instructors teach or 
students learn. To suggest measuring something other than educational value is not only 
contrary  to  Portland  Terminal,  but  dismissive  of  the  Division  and  the  lower  courts’ 
driving concern in policing the trainee exception. 
                                                 
148 See EDWARDS AND HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 36, at 4 (pitching a test under which the unpaid 
intern is an employee if the employer’s financial benefit is greater than its financial cost); Yamada (2002), 
supra note 6, at 235 (submitting a test under which unpaid interns without an academic connection are 
employees if they “spend[] more time performing work that provides an economic benefit to the employer 
than participating in formal training programs”); Curiale, supra note 3, at 122 (proposing, under a mistaken 
view of the Division’s formal rulemaking powers, a Division rulemaking to convert the six-factor test into 
an all-or-nothing test with Chevron deference); Durrant, supra note 36, at 187-88 (suggesting that an 
unpaid intern should be an employee whenever the employer seeks a present or future benefit from the 
intern). 
149 See EDWARDS AND HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 36, at 4; Yamada (2002), supra note 6, at 235; 
Curiale, supra note 3, at 122; Durrant, supra note 36, at 187-88. 21 
 
  The educational inquiry test will not produce perfectly predictable results, at least 
not in its first few cases. However, detailed factors make even balancing tests somewhat 
more consistent in their application.
150 The educational inquiry test attempts to make up 
for its lack of a precise line with an abundance of guidance on how the Division, courts, 
and employers should analyze internships. It keeps faith with  Portland Terminal’s full 
consideration of the instructor-learner relationship while giving decision-makers tools to 
measure  that  relationship  in  a  defensible  way.  Through  case  law  and  continued 
elaboration of the test, decision-makers will gain an instrument that both writes consistent 
decisions and takes educational value seriously. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  This Note does not call for a change in the administrative and judicial attitude, but 
rather a change in analysis. The Division and the courts want to support educational 
programs  that  offer  learning  opportunities  outside  the  classroom.  In  an  attempt  to 
transform  that  desire  into  a  useful  test,  the  decision-makers  have  leaned  on  schools, 
creating a doctrine in which unpaid internships affiliated with an educational institution 
receive far greater favor than standalone positions. However, in so leaning, the decision-
makers have failed to take into account the incentive structures and oversight practices of 
schools, both of which dramatically undermine the wisdom of academic reliance. The 
recent internship cases of Kaplan and Demayo capture both the extent of courts’ faith in 
scholastic  judgment  and  the  problems  with  that  faith.  The  Glatt  court  stated  that 
“[r]eceipt of academic credit is of little moment” under the New York minimum wage 
law,  which  may  be  true  —  but  under  the  FLSA,  it  is  of  great  moment.  As  long  as 
academic endorsement holds pride of place, the law of unpaid internships will not reflect 
the educational goals that should be its foundation. 
When allegations that unpaid internships aggravate inequality are given a more 
nuanced look, an unexpected picture arises, one that demands solutions other than either 
eradication of unpaid internships or the status quo. As with so many other issues, slow 
data  aggregation  and  methodical  examination  produce  better  law  and  policy  than 
polemics. As more numbers on the economics of internships trickle in and as researchers 
figure out the best ways to stimulate workplace learning, the Division and the courts must 
take care to mold a law of unpaid internships that facilitates, rather than hinders, equality 
of opportunity. 
For unpaid internships will play no small part in the future of social mobility. 
Over one million college students intern before they graduate, over 60% of the total, and 
if history is any guide that number will rise. A college degree is less a mark of distinction 
than it used to be, so students seek additional qualifications to set them apart from their 
peers. If unpaid internships fail to provide the rigor and mastery necessary to catch an 
employer’s notice, students may be forced to alternatives even less friendly to those with 
few means, graduate school among them.
151 For the moment, employers say they want 
internships, and moderate-income students are responding in droves, even if unpaid. If 
                                                 
150 See Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1278 (1975) (noting that the 
“more elaborate specification of the relevant factors may help to produce more principled and predictable 
decisions” in the application of a procedural Due Process balancing test). 
151 See Yglesias, supra note 2. 22 
 
the  law  can  guarantee  that  those  students  gain  the  skills  to  compete,  then  unpaid 
internships will become a tool for social mobility. 